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Application of the Child Soldiers 
Prevention Act to Myanmar: A Case Study 
in How a Simple Statute Insufficiently 




Congress enacted the Child Soldiers Prevention Act in order to stop 
public funds from directly supporting armies that use child soldiers. This 
paper examines how the Act has been applied to Myanmar, where both 
State and nonstate forces recruit children. Myanmar’s internal conflict 
illustrates numerous reasons for why children may join armed groups and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An estimated 250,000- 300,000 children currently participate in armed 
conflicts around the world.1 Scholars attempting to wade through the 
myriad of case reports on child soldiers note that “the picture is far more 
complex than the international legal imagination acknowledges.”2 Some 
cases of child soldier recruitment involve adults who “deceive children and 
trick them into joining” while other children “come forward intentionally to 
join armed forces or groups.”3 Once a child joins an armed group, they may 
be kept from hostilities or they may “serve as frontline troops.”4 The 
trauma experienced by child soldiers is demonstrated in one child’s 
recollection of facing enemy soldiers when he was twelve, 
“There were seven of us and seven or ten of the enemy. I was too afraid 
to look, so I put my face in the ground and shot my gun at the sky. I was 
afraid their bullets would hit my head. I fired two magazines, about forty 
rounds. I was afraid that if I didn’t fire the section leader would punish 
me.”5 
Girls make up an estimated 40 percent of child soldier cases.6 Female 
child soldiers “face sexual exploitation, often times by men over twice their 
age.”7 Alternatively, girls may join “an army or rebel group in which 
sexual conduct is not permitted amongst the troops” as a way of escaping 
sexual abuse at home.8 
The international community has attempted to address child soldiering 
through the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional 
Protocol) wherein State parties agreed to prohibit persons under the age of 
18 years from participating in hostilities.9 In 2008, Congress took further 
 
 1. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CHILD SOLDIERS, 5 (Mark A. Drumbl & Jastine C. Barrett 
eds., 2019). 
 2. Id. at 8. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Nancy Morisseau, Seen but Not Heard: Child Soldiers Suing Gun Manufacturers 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1263, 1279 (2004). 
 5. KEVIN HEPPNER, MY GUN WAS AS TALL AS ME, HUM. RTS. REP. (2002), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/burma/Burma0902.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2021). 
 6. Drumbl & Barrett, supra note 1, at 2.  
 7. Katie Valder, A Stolen Childhood: A Look into the World of Female Child Soldiers 
and the Initiatives Targeting the Ending of the Practice, 7 ALBANY GOV. L. REV. 35, 40 
(2014). 
 8. Id. at 38. 
 9. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict, opened for signature May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 
(entered into force Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].  
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action on the issue of child soldiers by passing the Child Soldiers 
Prevention Act (CSPA), which prevents U.S. military aid from supporting 
armies that use child soldiers.10 While the CSPA’s goal of preventing 
American taxpayer money from funding child soldiers is admirable, there 
are significant loopholes that allow it to be circumvented. Even when the 
CSPA is fully applied, as it has been to Myanmar, use of child soldiers by 
state and non-state forces continues to occur. 
Myanmar, also known as Burma, provides an important case study 
with regards to child soldiers due to the complexities in its internal conflict. 
In 2002, an estimated 70,000 child soldiers were part of Myanmar’s state 
army and several thousand more served in non-state armed groups 
including the United Wa State Army and the Karen National Liberation 
Army.11 The CSPA has been unable to address problems with child soldiers 
in any of these armies and its aim has been subverted through decisions by 
the State Department and the Department of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement.  
This note will explore the CSPA and the ongoing conflicts involving 
child soldiers in Myanmar, as an illustration of the CSPA’s limitations. Part 
One will provide context regarding the use of child soldiers in modern 
times and how the international community has tried to address the 
practice. Part Two will examine how the U.S. approached the problem by 
enacting the CSPA and what criticisms exist of the law. Part Three will 
provide context of Myanmar’s internal conflict and the use of child soldiers 
by three armed forces within the country. Part Four will address how the 
CSPA has been applied to Myanmar during the Obama and Trump 
presidencies. Finally, Part Five will propose amendments to the CSPA 
which would help address some of its failures. 
II. CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Historically, the practice of recruiting children to take up arms or 
participate in battle was widespread in both indigenous and Western 
societies– indeed around 420,000 children fought for the Union forces 
during the U.S. civil war.12 Modern recognition that children are uniquely 
vulnerable to the physical and psychological tolls of armed conflict spurred 
a movement to end the use of child soldiers. Despite current international 
 
 10. Child Soldiers Prevention Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370c (2008). 
 11. HEPPNER, supra note 5. 
 12. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CHILD SOLDIERS, supra note 1, at 154. 
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law prohibitions and near-universal condemnation of the practice, experts 
estimate that child soldiers are actively engaged in 75% of conflicts around 
the world today.13 The U.N. Security Council’s 2020 report on Children in 
Armed Conflict verified 7,747 instances of child soldier recruitment, the 
youngest involving a six-year-old.14 This section will discuss the 
international legal framework States have tried to establish in order to end 
the use of child soldiers and why the practice nevertheless remains 
widespread.  
B. RIGHTS OF THE CHILD PERSPECTIVE 
Every country in the world besides the U.S. is a party to the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).15 CRC espouses the idea that 
children have the right to “the full and harmonious development of his or 
her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere 
of happiness, love, and understanding.”16 CRC establishes the definition of 
a “child” as “every human being below the age of 18 years.”17 However, 
“the treaty still allows nations to define a younger age of majority and to 
establish an earlier age for the attainment of legal rights and duties of 
adulthood.”18 Article 38 of CRC only prohibits States from “recruiting any 
person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed 
forces.”19 
CRC does not provide a good framework for addressing the 
recruitment of adolescents who are considered children under the treaty but 
may be viewed as mature enough to know what they are getting involved in 
and bear responsibility for their actions. This absence is notable in light of 
data indicating that “the vast majority of children associated with armed 
forces or armed groups worldwide are 16-and-17-year-olds.”20 The 
simplified narrative which exists in the “international legal imagination” of 
 
     13. Heather L. Carmody, The Child Soldiers Prevention Act: How the Act’s Inadequacy 
Leaves the World’s Children Vulnerable, 43 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 234, 238 (2012). 
 14. U.N. Secretary-General, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on Children and 
Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/74/845-S/2020/525 (June 9, 2020).  
 15. Sarah Mehta, There’s Only One Country That Hasn’t Ratified the Convention on 
Children’s Rights: US, ACLU (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:30PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/human-
rights/treaty-ratification/theres-only-one-country-hasnt-ratified-convention-childrens (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2021). 
 16. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  
 17. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  
 18. DAVID M. ROSEN, CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE WESTERN IMAGINATION: FROM PATRIOTS 
TO VICTIMS 155 (2015). 
 19. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 38, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  
 20. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CHILD SOLDIERS, supra note 1, at 5. 
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child soldiers as merely being victims taken advantage of by warlords fails 
to acknowledge any agency on the part of a child who may be old enough 
to understand the choices presented to them.21 It does not fully appreciate 
intolerable conditions and hardships which push children who have grown 
up in war zones to join armed groups. 
The CRC’s Optional Protocol addresses some of its shortcomings by 
raising the minimum age for participation in armed conflict to 18, imposing 
a burden on States to take reasonable steps to prevent nonstate armed 
groups from recruiting children in the State’s territory, and requiring States 
to cooperate and provide financial assistance in rehabilitation and social 
integration efforts.22 170 states, including the U.S., have ratified the 
Optional Protocol.23 However, a worldwide effort to raise the age of 
military recruitment to 18 is not, by itself, going to end the trauma 
experienced by children in unstable regions. The treaty’s outcome may be 
more symbolic than substantive if State parties do not proactively engage in 
exposing and curtailing instability which pressures armies to recruit 
children or fails to provide viable alternative paths for children in those 
regions. 
C. USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS 
Ninety percent of the child soldier cases in the most recent U.N. 
Security Council report were conducted by nonstate actors.24 Nonstate 
armed groups are “dissident armed forces or other groups, which have a 
clear command structure and exercise power over a given territory.”25 
Nonstate groups may use child soldiers because “they do not share, or flatly 
reject, the cultural view about children or childhood held by the 
international community. . . [believing] that the applicable standards have 
largely been forged in the West and imposed upon the rest of the world.”26  
Nonstate armed groups may also disregard international standards out 
of desperation or a perceived lack of alternatives. General Aung Mya of the 
nonstate Karenni Army in Myanmar responded to questions about child 
 
 21. Id. at 1.  
 22. Optional Protocol, supra note 9, at art. 1, 4, 7.  
 23. Optional Protocol, supra note 9.  
 24. U.N. Secretary-General, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on Children and 
Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/74/845-S/2020/525 (June 9, 2020).  
 25. Janel B. Galvanek & Yvonne Kemper, Testing the Paradigms of the 
Humanitarian Dialogue with Non-State Armed Groups: The Unique Challenges of Ending 
the Use of Child Soldiers, 31 SICHERHEIT UND FRIEDEN (S+F) / SECURITY AND PEACE 28, 29 
(2013).  
 26. David M. Rosen, Who Is a Child - The Legal Conundrum of Child 
Soldiers, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 81, 86 (2009). 
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soldiers within his army’s ranks by saying, 
“We’d like to abide by the international protocol [on children in armed 
conflict] and have these rules. . . but it is hard to get support because no 
one recognizes us as a legal organization. We have some ideas for 
projects for some of our young boys in the army, but we can’t get any 
support from outside organizations. . . the most important thing for these 
young people is education, and we’d like to see them get back to 
school. . . [However, if] we want to insist that they finish eight or tenth 
[grade] before joining then we have to provide schools everywhere. 
Many have no access to schools.”27 
The government of Myanmar does not provide government-run 
schools in some of the regions controlled by non-state armed groups.28 
Children in those regions therefore rely on the nonstate groups to ensure 
educational opportunities are available. If the group that controls a region 
does not prioritize providing schools, there are no easy alternatives for 
children to receive a good education. The problem regarding child soldier 
recruitment and a lack of educational opportunities can perpetuate itself 
because it is in the interest of armed groups that recruit children for there to 
be a large number of children without other opportunities.  
Even if a nonstate group does make a genuine effort to provide 
opportunities, they face additional barriers due to their nonstate status. The 
Karen National Union, a different nonstate group in Myanmar, contacted 
the U.N. “requesting that the U.N. come to verify the fact that they do not 
use child soldiers [anymore]” and make an action plan to help any affected 
children.29 However, “despite the group’s willingness and interest” to work 
with the U.N., the government of Myanmar restricted U.N. access to the 
territory, creating a barrier for collaboration between nonstate groups and 
the international community.30  
III. THE CHILD SOLDIERS PREVENTION ACT (CSPA) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. is complicit in enabling the use of child soldiers. Under the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President is authorized to finance 
foreign countries’ procurement of defense articles and defense services,31 
 
 27. HEPPNER, supra note 5, at 143. 
 28. Telephone Interview with Saw N., former KNLA child soldier (Feb. 27, 2021) (on 
file with author).  
 29. Galvanek & Kemper, supra note 25, at 35. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 22 U.S.C. § 2763. 
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provide foreign countries with surplus defense articles at no cost,32 and 
furnish military education and training to military and civilian personnel of 
foreign countries.33 A 2007 Center for Defense Information (CDI) report on 
U.S. military assistance revealed that eight out of nine countries whose 
government-sponsored forces used child soldiers had received U.S. military 
aid of this nature.34 In the five-year period between 2002 and 2007, CDI 
identified $400 million dollars of foreign military financing, $16 million 
dollars of international military education and training, and $60 million 
dollars of value in excess defense articles which had been provided to those 
States which used child soldiers.35  
The 2008 Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) was enacted in 
response to the CDI report “to ensure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are not 
used to support this abhorrent practice [of using child soldiers] by any 
government or government sanctioned military and paramilitary 
organization.”36 This section will look at the CSPA and examine its 
shortcomings.  
B. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO PREVENT US TAXPAYERS FROM 
FUNDING CHILD SOLDIERS 
Congressional hearings on the CSPA indicate a desire among 
lawmakers to assert the economic and political influence of the U.S. to end 
the practice of child soldiering around the world. Senator Durbin who 
introduced the bill testified, 
“There is a clear legal prohibition on recruiting and using child soldiers, 
and yet around the world hundreds of thousands of boys and girls are 
used as combatants, porters, human mine detectors and sex slaves. In 
countries like Burma, Uganda, and Colombia, children’s health and lives 
are endangered and their childhoods sacrificed. . . We must work to 
eliminate the use of child soldiers. . . Even during times of war, the law 
should never fall silent for the most vulnerable among us– our 
children.”37 
 
 32. 22 U.S.C. § 2321(j). 
 33. 22 U.S.C. § 2347. 
 34. CTR. FOR DEF. INFO., U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES USING CHILD 
SOLDIERS, 1990-2007, (2007), 
http://www.pogoarchives.org/straus/cdi_archive/CSBillCharts.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 
2021). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Casualties of War: Child Soldiers and the Law on S. Hrg. 110-176 Before the 
Subcomm. on Hum. Rts. and the L. of the S. Comm. On Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin). 
 37. Id. 
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Senator Durbin noted that the U.S. had “ratified the Optional 
Protocol. . . which also prohibits the recruitment and use of child soldiers 
but if the law is not enforced, it is meaningless. . . When there is no 
accountability for violating the law, governments and rebel forces can 
violate human rights with impunity.”38 
As a policy decision, the CSPA seeks to both end the U.S.’s own 
complicity in the use of child soldiers and take a more active approach 
towards curbing the practice by pressuring States with a threat they are 
likely to respond to– withholding weapons transfers and military training. 
Under the CSPA, the Secretary of State is required to research and list 
which foreign governments use soldiers who are under the age of eighteen 
in its annual Trafficking in Persons (TiP) report.39 The TiP report is 
prepared using information from “U.S. embassies, government officials, 
nongovernmental and international organizations, published reports, news 
articles, academic studies, research trips” and other sources.40 Countries 
listed in the TiP report as using child soldiers are not eligible to receive 
military aid or licenses for direct commercial sales of weapons from the 
U.S.41  
The CSPA allows the President to waive its application for a country 
if doing so is in the “national interest.”42 The President also has the option 
to reinstate military assistance to countries who have adequately 
“implemented policies and mechanisms to prohibit and prevent future 
government or government-supported use of child soldiers and to ensure 
that no children are recruited, conscripted, or otherwise compelled to serve 
as child soldiers.”43  
This carrot-or-stick strategy has the potential to be very effective 
provided that States value weapons and training over their practices of 
recruiting children into their own armed forces or turning a blind eye 
towards the recruitment of children among forces they sponsor. It furthers 
the goals of the Optional Protocol by providing States with a tangible 
reason for why they should adhere to their obligations under the treaty and 
recognize 18 as an international standard for recruitment. However, 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c–2(b). 
 40. OFF. TO MONITOR & COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERS., U.S DEP'T OF STATE, 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, (2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 
2021). 
 41. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c–1(a). 
 42. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c–1(c). 
 43. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c–1(d). 
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incentivizing armies to cease using child soldiers so that they can receive 
free weapons is not likely to address underlying issues of instability and 
violent conflict which harm children. 
C. CRITICISMS OF CSPA 
1. The Waiver Loophole 
Since the CSPA was enacted, over $4 billion dollars in military 
assistance has been given to offending countries who use child soldiers in 
their State forces.44 Critics believe the “loophole” which allows the 
President to waive application of the law for certain listed countries is too 
deferential and provides no accountability regarding a President’s 
decision.45 
The statute’s text does not define “national interest”‘ or provide 
guidance on how one should determine what circumstances make providing 
material support for armies justifiable.46 An earlier version of the CSPA bill 
included an additional exception for countries who assist the U.S. in 
counterterrorism.47 Its omission from the final law signals that Congress 
did not consider counterterrorism alone to be a sufficient cause for granting 
a waiver to a country whose army uses child soldiers in their fight against 
terrorism.48 A press release issued by Congressman Fortenberry, an author 
of the CSPA, urging President Obama to enforce the statute after he waived 
its application to four of six identified countries in 2010 further indicates 
that Congress did not intend for waivers to be used broadly.49 
Nevertheless, President Obama and, subsequently, President Trump 
continued to liberally issue waivers of the CSPA’s application every year. 
In 2019, President Trump waived it for seven of eleven listed countries.50 
2. CSPA Does Not Address International Small Arms Proliferation 
The CSPA’s power is derived from the U.S.’s status as the world’s 
 
 44. Rachel Stohl & Ryan Fletcher, Trump Administration Turns Its Back on Child 
Soldiers Again, THE HILL (Nov. 4, 2019), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-
policy/468875-trump-administration-turns-its-back-on-child-soldiers (last visited Apr. 20, 
2021). 
 45. Sonja Larimore, Child Soldiering and How the United States Can Up Its Game 
Against Those States That Still Continue This Practice, 42 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 28, 51 
(2019). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Carmody, supra note 13, at 262. 
 48. Id. at 263. 
 49. Id. at 260. 
 50. Stohl & Fletcher, supra note 44. 
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largest arms exporter.51 However, it does not address weapons sales which 
occur from other States and private parties. While States rely on the U.S. to 
produce heavy weapons such as military vehicles, private companies are 
the main suppliers of small arms and light weapons such as rifles, AK-47s, 
and land mines.52 A country looking to procure small arms has many 
alternative suppliers besides the U.S., especially if they are open to buying 
used or surplus weapons.53 
Globally militaries procure around 1 million small arms units every 
year.54 Most countries maintain stockpiles of weapons which are 
replenished through “a slow and constant turnover of weapons to replace 
lost and damaged stocks. . . punctuated by major procurement [programs] 
whereby countries replace a large portion of their existing stocks over a 
relatively short space of time.”55 When wealthy states procure new 
weapons, unless they have a policy to destroy the old stocks which are 
being displaced, their outdated surplus equipment ends up “dumped at 
extremely low prices into war zones, creating a buyer’s market.”56 In 2006, 
it was estimated that 280,000 weapons are acquired each year from surplus 
transfers.57 
The widespread availability of small arms fuels endless cycles of 
violence and contributes to instability in areas of longstanding conflicts 
where they are “used in extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, 
and torture.”58 Child soldiers can be easily trained to handle small arms, 
whereas their small size might limit their utility for operating heavy 
machinery or engaging in physical combat. An army’s possession of small 
arms “means [children] can be deployed in active combat without any 
apparent ‘hardware’ disadvantages.”59 
 
 51. US Remains Top Arms Exporter and Grows Market Share, BBC (Mar. 15, 2021), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56397601. 
 52. Morisseau, supra note 4, at 1267. 
 53. SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006: UNFINISHED BUSINESS, 7 (2006), 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2006/en/Small-Arms-Survey-
2006-Prelims-Intro-EN.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 9. 
 56. Morisseau, supra note 4, at 1269. 
 57. SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2006: UNFINISHED BUSINESS, supra note 53, at 26. 
 58. Rachel Stohl, Targeting Children: Small Arms and Children in Conflict, 9 BROWN 
J. WORLD AFF. 281, 283 (2002). 
 59. Steven Freeland, Mere Children or Weapons of War— Child Soldiers and 
International Law, 29 UNIV. OF LA VERNE L. REV. 19, 26 (2008). 
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3. Exclusive Focus on State Forces 
Article Four of the Optional Protocol provides that States are 
responsible for stemming the use of child soldiers by nonstate actors.60 The 
CSPA is only directed at State forces and there is no parallel provision to 
incentivize or pressure non-state forces to end the practice of child soldiers. 
Nonstate actors may receive U.S. made weapons directly from States 
or through the black market. Of the $1.3 billion dollars requested by the 
Pentagon in 2015 to provide weapons to the government forces of Iraq in 
their fight against the Islamic State, $24.1 million was intended for 
weapons which would be provided to tribal fighters via Iraq’s military.61 
Whistleblowers within the Iraqi security forces reported widespread 
corruption regarding these appropriations leading to black market sales of 
the weapons.62 Iraqi Col. Shaaban al-Obeidi reportedly told allies from the 
U.S. not to “give any weapons through the army– not even one piece– 
because corruption is everywhere and you will not see any of it. . . If each 
soldier is supposed to get 100 bullets, he will only get 50 and the officer 
will sell the rest.”63 The sheer number of weapons provided to Iraq during 
the conflict indicates that the Pentagon responds to reports that their 
weapons end up in the wrong hands by merely providing additional 
weapons to compensate for whatever pieces may be lost to the black 
market since “reducing corruption is not part of the advisers’ role.”64 
The lack of accountability demonstrated in Iraq for weapons provided 
by U.S. military aid has grave implications regarding the final destination 
of weapons provided to any State with known corruption. Lax standards for 
weapons receipt may subvert CSPA’s mission if they frequently allow 
weapons subsidized by American taxpayers to end up on the black market, 
where they could fall into the hands of other organizations that use child 
soldiers. 
4. Sanctions Cannot Address the Root Causes of the Child Soldier 
Problem 
Approaching the issue from the angle of weapons sales does not 
address the root causes for why children take up arms. As discussed above, 
 
 60. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict, art. 4, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222.  
 61. David Kirkpatrick, Graft Hobbles Iraq’s Military in Fighting ISIS, N.Y. TIMES ( 
Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/world/middleeast/graft-hobbles-
iraqs-military-in-fighting-isis.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2021). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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children join armed forces for a variety of reasons stemming from a 
region’s instability. Armies which recruit children will likely continue to do 
so even if they are unable to procure weapons.65  
As the next section will show, Myanmar’s State forces routinely 
abduct and recruit children despite a limited number of weapons 
suppliers.66 Meanwhile, children who perceive that they would be safer in a 
non-state armed group likely feel that way in response to actions taken by 
opposing forces in their villages regardless of the weapons capabilities of 
the non-state force they join.67 Policies that do not foster peace between 
groups and create opportunities children can pursue safely will not prevent 
recruitment of children into armed organizations. 
IV. CHILD SOLDIERS IN MYANMAR 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Myanmar is an interesting case study for understanding the nuances of 
modern child soldiering because both State and nonstate armed forces 
recruit child soldiers through voluntary and forcible means. U.S. 
policymaking decisions regarding child soldiers and weapons transfers do 
affect children in Myanmar even though the U.S. military is not engaged in 
any conflict in the country. 
B. OVERVIEW OF MYANMAR’S INTERNAL CONFLICT 
Myanmar has been the site of ongoing civil war and violent unrest 
since winning independence from the United Kingdom in 1948.68 Myanmar 
recognizes 135 ethnic groups within the country, through 70% of the 
population is ethnically Bamar (Burman).69 Under colonial rule, the British 
governed with a strategy of “strangers policing strangers” where police 
forces were composed of British, Indian, and ethnic minority officers rather 
than people from the Bamar ethnic group.70  
A coup d’état in 1962 brought the country into the control of a 
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military regime that treated ethnic minorities and political dissidents 
brutally.71 Ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) including the United Wa 
State Army, the Karen National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army-
South, the Kachin Independence Army, the Karenni Army, the Mon 
National Liberation Army, the Arakan Army, and the Ta’ang National 
Liberation Army have all be in ongoing conflict with Myanmar’s state 
forces, which are known as the Tatmadaw, over the right to control their 
traditional lands.72 
In response to threats from EAOs, Myanmar developed a strategy they 
termed “four cuts.”73 The strategy was to cut off a rebel group’s access to 
four critical resources- food, finances, intelligence, and new recruits.74 To 
achieve each “cut” the Tatmadaw engaged in tactics which had a deadly 
toll on the ethnic groups including “targeting of civilians deemed to support 
[EAOs], indiscriminate firing of weapons, the destruction of homes, and 
the forced relocation of civilian populations to areas not accessible by 
[EAOs].”75 
In 1988, student led protests by the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) brought over a million civilians to the streets to demand political 
and economic changes.76 The Tatmadaw responded with a harsh crackdown 
that led to at least 3,000 deaths.77 After a Constitutional referendum nearly 
three decades later, Myanmar began to transition from exclusively military 
control to a quasi-democracy.78 The 2008 Constitution provided for free 
elections, although a quarter of all parliamentary seats were reserved for 
the military.79 The NLD won a majority in the 2015 elections and ran 
Myanmar’s government from 2015 through 2020, though the Tatmadaw 
continued to exert power and influence over all levels of government 
decision making.80  
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In February 2021, the Tatmadaw staged a coup after contesting NLD’s 
victory in the 2020 elections.81 The coup has seen the Tatmadaw killing 
scores of protesters including children and even infants.82 
C. CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE TATMADAW 
The Tatmadaw is estimated to have 400,000 troops.83 The Tatmadaw 
has been viewed harshly by the international community due to charges of 
“war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.”84 Since the year 
2000, China, Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia are the only countries which have 
reported to the U.N. that they have provided arms to Myanmar.85 India and 
North Korea have also allegedly provided weapons to Myanmar, though 
those countries failed to report the sales to the U.N. Register of 
Conventional Arms.86 Myanmar also receives weapons and ammunitions 
through black market trade, evidenced by Italian-made bullets found in 
victims of a Tatmadaw attack.87 
In 2002, the Tatmadaw had an estimated 70,000 child soldiers in their 
ranks, more than any other country in the world at the time.88 In partnership 
with the U.N., the Tatmadaw has reported discharging 1,000 child soldiers 
between 2004 and 2014.89 However, new cases of child soldier recruitment 
by the Tatmadaw continue to be reported.90 The 2019 TiP report noted that 
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international monitors had verified 49 new cases of child soldier 
recruitment in 2017 and were reviewing 174 cases from 2018.91 
Furthermore they “documented dozens of cases of child soldier use by the 
Tatmadaw, including three incidents involving 54 children– possibly in 
direct hostilities– in northern Rakhine State.”92  
The TiP report criticized Myanmar for filing fraud charges against 
former child soldiers for lying about their age and had imposed a two-and-
a-half year sentence of hard labor for “defaming the military” on Aung Ko 
Htway, a former child soldier who had talked to an international media 
outlet about his experience being abducted from a train station and forced 
into the Tatmadaw.93 Instead of holding officials responsible for 
kidnapping, forced labor, and child endangerment, Myanmar imposed 
criminal liability onto the victims themselves. The report’s condemnation 
of Myanmar for imposing these charges is well-deserved because of the 
high likelihood other child soldiers will be dissuaded from coming forward 
to demobilize or serve as whistleblowers.94 
Aung Ko Htway’s story of abduction by the Tatmadaw is, sadly, 
common. The practice of child recruitment through fraud, coercion, and 
force is believed to have increased dramatically after the 1988 crackdown 
led to an increased demand for soldiers but a reduced number of people 
willing to volunteer.95 Quotas and incentives pressure both military and 
civilian recruiters to find new soldiers and poor children make easy targets. 
In 2002, the payout for bringing in a new recruit was between “1,000 and 
10,000 kyat in cash and fifteen to fifty kilograms of rice” depending on the 
region.96 Some soldiers, who may have been forcibly conscripted 
themselves, were promised that they could get out of the army after five 
years of service if they brought in five new recruits to replace them.97 One 
former child soldier explained that the recruiters look for 
“children who are eleven or twelve, who don’t know anything and who 
aren’t with their parents. Some of them are in the railway station, some 
of them are selling things in the market, some of them are carry boys– 
they capture these kinds of children. Sometimes they hit them and take 
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them, sometimes they buy sweets for them and then take them.”98 
Former child soldiers interviewed by Human Rights Watch recall 
undergoing four to five months of physically grueling basic training.99 One 
former child soldier described the routine beatings that occurred during 
training,  
“If we made a mistake or didn’t obey we were beaten. People were 
beaten every day. . . I was beaten when I couldn’t follow instructions. I 
was beaten when I made mistakes in the gun training. If one member of a 
group made a mistake, the whole group could be beaten.”100 
After training, recruits are sent to join battalions stationed across 
Myanmar, sometimes on the front line where they are expected to engage 
in firefight.101 During the 1990s, the Tatmadaw forced thousands of its 
soldiers, including children, to “run across an open killing ground full of 
barbed wire and landmines straight into [an opposing army’s] machine-gun 
encampments.”102  
D. CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY 
The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is the largest non-state army in 
Myanmar with an estimated 30,000 troops.103 The Wa people are 
indigenous to the region between northern Myanmar and southern China, 
with an estimated half million Wa people on either side of the border.104 
The UWSA controls 30,000 square kilometers of territory in that region.105  
The Wa territory remained relatively unexplored by outsiders during 
the colonial period, in part because they liked to decapitate their enemies 
and then “bring the heads back to display. . . at the entrance to their own 
village” and this practice scared officers.106 The British presence in the 
region was “limited to annual flag marches to the Chinese border.”107 
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During post-independence peace talks on how Myanmar should be 
organized, a Wa representative declared, “we do not want to join with 
anybody because in the past we have been very independent.”108 However, 
they were not given the option to become their own country.109 
The origin of the UWSA began in the late 1960’s when the Wa people 
were recruited into the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).110 The Wa left 
CPB in 1989 because “the CPB promoted the superiority of the Burmans 
and paid little respect to minorities.”111 Within 6 months, former Wa CPB 
fighters had formed the UWSA.112 The UWSA immediately signed a 
ceasefire with the Tatmadaw and, with their support, began an offensive 
against their former allies.113 Due to the ceasefire agreement, the Tatmadaw 
tolerated the UWSA’s activities which increasingly involved narcotics 
trafficking.114 Relations between the UWSA and the Tatmadaw remained 
peaceful until 2009 when fighting broke out.115 The UWSA has not 
accepted terms of a new ceasefire and dramatically walked out of 2015 
peace talks where eight other EAOs signed a joint ceasefire agreement with 
the Tatmadaw.116 
The UWSA is heavily involved in the production of both opioids and 
methamphetamines.117 Myanmar is the world’s second largest grower of 
opium poppies after Afghanistan, in large part due to the UWSA.118 
Between 1987 and 1992, coinciding with formation and growth of the 
UWSA, opium poppy cultivation in the Wa regions increased from 92,300 
hectares to 154,000 hectares.119 Meanwhile, Thailand began cracking down 
on the production of methamphetamine in the 1990s and manufacturers 
were given sanctuary across the border in the Wa regions in return for a 
share of the profits.120  
In 2005, eight UWSA leaders were indicted in the U.S. federal court 
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on drug-related charges including importing more than one ton of heroin 
into the U.S.121 The indictment alleged that “defendants and the UWSA 
provide security for heroin and methamphetamine laboratories in Wa 
territory, as well as for drug caravans smuggling heroin and 
methamphetamine from Eastern Burma to Thailand, China, Laos where 
independent brokers smuggle shipments to international distribution 
organizations in Asia, Europe, and the United States.”122 
Accurate numbers on child soldiers among the UWSA ranks is 
impossible to ascertain due to limited reporting in the region though it is 
believed that there are at least 2,000.123 The UWSA has a conscription 
system where every family, regardless of if they are ethnically Wa or not, 
must give a son to the army where he will remain for the rest of his life.124 
A commander with the UWSA said that they begin recruiting fifteen-year-
olds but “if an elder brother who is sixteen does not want to join and the 
younger one wants to, then we will recruit the younger one even though he 
may be only thirteen.”125 One observer who visited a UWSA camp 
described that “the [recruited children live] in barracks with racks of M16s 
on the opposite wall. They’re taught in school and train with weapons 
starting at age eight. . . I don’t know what age they’re deployed, but I met 
many very young Wa soldiers. At least ten percent of them are child 
soldiers.”126 
E. CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE KAREN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY 
The Karen ethnic group is a “hill and forest dwelling people” 
indigenous to a region in eastern Myanmar they refer to as 
“Kawthoolei.”127 There are five million Karen people, which amounts to 
7% of Myanmar’s population.128  
The traditional Karen creation myth resembles the Garden of Eden 
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story where humans fell from grace due to a snake’s deception.129 When 
European missionaries arrived in Myanmar, many Karen people converted 
to Christianity willingly and were given preferential treatment by colonial 
policies.130 As the movement for Burmese independence evolved in the 
early twentieth century, the Karen supported the British and helped 
suppress insurrections.131 One American missionary, writing about the anti-
British Saya San rebellion in the 1930s observed that “the help [the Karen] 
have given the government during this rebellion is going to make it harder 
for them if separation comes.”132 
The Karen National Union (KNU) was formed by Karen Leaders in 
1947 when it became clear that they would not be granted independent 
statehood.133 For over 70 years, the KNU– and its armed wing the Karen 
National Liberation Army (KNLA)– have been fighting the Tatmadaw for 
the right to control Kawthoolei.134  
Kawthoolei is divided into seven districts, each with its own KNU 
“brigade.”135 The KNU provides schools and hospitals in its territory.136 At 
its peak, the KNLA had between ten and twenty thousand soldiers and 
KNU exerted full control over a large territory.137 KNLA soldiers serve for 
life with no salary and “no option of discharge except in cases of 
incapacity.”138 Like other EOAs, smuggling is a key source of income, 
though the KNU deals in timber and minerals rather than narcotics.139 Guns 
used by the KNLA are old and “don’t work well.”140 
The Tatmadaw’s “repeated military assaults against ethnic minority 
villages in which there were no armed opposition forces or other apparent 
military target” were particularly pronounced against the Karen.141 As a 
result, nearly one million Karen people have been displaced due to conflict 
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and an untold number have died.142 Nearly a century of violence and 
instability has created conditions which put children in harm’s way and 
hinders their access to alternatives such as education.  
Many children join KNLA ranks ostensibly through their own volition 
because they are “motivated by revenge or for the material benefits of 
being in the army such as food and clothing, because life in the KNLA is 
often seen as safer than their villages.”143 Children in refugee camps are 
particularly vulnerable for recruitment as a serious lack of opportunities 
makes joining KNLA seem like one of their only options. 
The KNU/KNLA had an official conscription policy until 1995, 
however some Karen villages continue to have recruiting quotas and 
sometimes provide underage boys to meet the requirement.144 One KNLA 
soldier, who was recruited at age sixteen, said his family was required to 
provide one of their nine children to the KNU.145 He believed that if his 
family paid the KNU a large sum of money, he would not have been forced 
to go.146 However, as poor villagers, “it would have been impossible for 
[his family] to raise the necessary amount.”147 
In 2002, the KNU General Secretary Pado Mahn estimated that there 
were 150 child soldiers in KNLA, though “independent observers believe 
the actual total may [have been] closer to 500 child soldiers.”148 If a child 
does serve as a soldier in the KNLA, they typically do chores and weapons 
maintenance around the bases without participating in combat, though they 
are trained in handling guns.149 One fifteen-year-old soldier said, “they 
wouldn’t let me [go to the front lines] because I’m too young.”150 Another 
said violent clashes between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw occurred often 
while he was a soldier but he never personally faced opposing forces 
because “I was young and not experienced so they left me behind [before 
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going to fight].”151 
When children try to enlist, KNU policy is to send them to school 
until they are adults.152 However, children will “lie about their age because 
their parents are suffering so they want to fight.”153 Some had previously 
been in school but quit or ran away because they are not good at their 
studies.154 A former child soldier in the KNLA who did return to school 
post-recruitment said he believed that providing education was helpful in 
preventing recruitment of child soldiers.155 However, of the other young 
soldiers he encountered in his brigade, he was the only one he knew of who 
had managed to continue to university.156 While getting an education is one 
way to get out of being a child soldier, young people facing those 
circumstances have so much slated against them and so few opportunities 
for advancement. The likelihood of a former recruit achieving success 
through school is rare even when efforts are made to steer them in that 
direction.  
V. APPLICATION OF CSPA TO MYANMAR 
A. INTRODUCTION  
When the CSPA was passed in 2008, Myanmar was the only country 
which had been identified as using child soldiers that the U.S. was not 
providing military assistance to in the form of financing, training, or 
surplus equipment transfers.157 Even so, there is a demonstrated desire for 
the legislation to affect the child soldier practice in Myanmar because both 
Senators Durbin and Feingold specifically mentioned it in congressional 
hearings on the CSPA.158 This section will explore how the CSPA has been 
applied to Myanmar and see how its goal has been subverted by the 
Executive Branch and by policies which provide for training and 
equipment transfers to foreign counter-narcotics police forces. 
B. APPLICATION FROM 2009 THROUGH 2017 
TiP reports from 2009 until 2017 acknowledged the child soldier 
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problem in Myanmar.159 The 2009 report stated that  
“Urban poor and street children in Rangoon and Mandalay are at risk of 
involuntary conscription as child soldiers by the Burmese junta. 
Thousands of children are forced to serve in Burma’s national army as 
desertions of men in the army rise. Some children were threatened with 
jail if they did not agree to join the army.”160 
In 2016, President Obama determined that it was in the “national 
interest” of the United States to waive the application of the CSPA to 
Myanmar.161 This decision came shortly after the NLD government came to 
power and its leaders were looking to spur economic growth in the 
country.162 The move was criticized by HRW as signaling that “the use of 
child soldiers by the [Tatmadaw] won’t be an impediment to possible 
future aid.”163 
C. APPLICATION AFTER 2017 
In 2017, Myanmar was completely removed from the TiP report as a 
country that uses child soldiers.164 Reuters reported that the decision to 
delist Myanmar, as well as Iraq, came directly from Secretary of State Rex 
Tillerson who “overruled his own staff’s assessments on the use of child 
soldiers in both countries and rejected the recommendation of senior 
diplomats in Asia and the Middle East who wanted to keep Iraq and 
Myanmar on the list.”165 Secretary Tillerson’s advisers acknowledged that 
the countries used child soldiers but said they interpreted the law to only 
apply to governments “making little or no effort to correct their child 
soldier violations.”166  
In response to the decision to delist the countries, a group of senior 
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State Department officials sent a memo to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee with allegations that Tillerson violated the CSPA.167 The memo 
said Tillerson’s decision had the effect of “contravening U.S. law” and 
“risks marring the credibility of a broad range of State Department reports 
and analyses and has weakened one of the U.S. government’s primary 
diplomatic tools to deter governmental armed forces and government-
supported armed groups from recruiting and using children in combat and 
support roles.”168 
The next year, Myanmar was back on the list and restrictions were not 
waived in 2018, 2019, or 2020.169 
D. SUBVERSION OF CSPA THROUGH US FUNDING OF ANTI-
NARCOTICS POLICE 
While the U.S. has been unable to provide military aid to Myanmar 
due to the CSPA, the law does not apply to equipment and training for anti-
narcotics police forces. The U.S. State Department Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) assists foreign law 
enforcement agencies in preventing cross-border crime which could 
negatively impact American interests.170 In 2017 the INL provided 
Myanmar with over $1 million dollars for “drug control efforts within the 
country.”171  
Counter-narcotics assistance provided to Myanmar included an 
“organized. . . visit of the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs to the U.S. 
which included consultations with senior U.S. officials, federal and local 
law enforcement officials, and NGOs” and trainings for some Burmese 
officials both “in country” and at the International Law Enforcement 
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Academy in Bangkok.172 The INL’s website states that “in early 2020, INL-
donated equipment was used in the largest seizure in Burma to date: over 
17 tons of methamphetamine tablets, 500 kg of crystal methamphetamine, 
292 kg of heroin, and 588 kg of opium.”173 
The Myanmar Police Force (MPF) is separate from the Tatmadaw but 
Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution places Ministry of Home Affairs– which 
MPF is a part of– under military jurisdiction.174 The current Home Affairs 
Minister was formerly Chief of Military Security Affairs and is the son of a 
senior General from the military junta.175  
During an uprising in 2007, “the police. . . worked closely with the 
army, not only to help suppress the demonstrations in the streets but also to 
identify, arrest, and interrogate protesters.”176 More recently, the 2021 coup 
has shown complete coordination between the Tatmadaw and the MPF 
where both police officers and soldiers have killed protesters.177 
Considering the reports from other countries about American weapons 
being diverted from their intended destination and ending up on the black 
market, it is not hard to imagine the same happening in Myanmar. Items 
provided to the MPF for drug control operations could easily end up in the 
hands of children, either through transfers from the MPF to the Tatmadaw 
or through black market sales to EAOs. 
Even if the equipment provided does not directly go to the Tatmadaw, 
Myanmar’s unique internal conflicts further complicates the ethics of 
funding and training their antinarcotics police force. UWSA, as both an 
insurgent army allegedly seeking control of their own territory and as a 
major drug trafficking organization, is a target of the Tatmadaw and the 
MPF. If both the police forces and the armed forces of a State are engaged 
in fighting the same army, assisting one is an indirect, yet significant way 
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of assisting the other. 
VI. IMPROVEMENTS TO CSPA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The case study of Myanmar provides a tangible example of how 
traumatic it is for children to be recruited into armed forces and the types of 
conditions which may prompt children to voluntarily enlist. It also 
illustrates how complicated the issue of child soldiers is to address because 
it inevitably coexists with other issues such as internal conflict between 
State and non-state forces or cycles wherein former child soldiers recruit 
new child soldiers as their way out. Myanmar is also an interesting example 
with regards to U.S. policy because the U.S. is not engaged in conflict in 
Myanmar and has almost always applied the CSPA towards Myanmar, yet 
American taxpayers are still contributing to training and weapons for its 
forces due to international counter-narcotics policies. Furthermore, even 
though normal U.S. military aid has not been given to Myanmar, the 
practice of using child soldiers continues unabated indicating that a carrot-
or-stick approach is not enough because it does not get to the heart of the 
issue. This final section will propose improvements to the CSPA which 
would help it better address the child soldier problem in light of the 
takeaways from Myanmar. 
B. DEFINE “NATIONAL INTEREST” EXCEPTION 
Reworking the waiver system is an important first step to improve the 
CSPA as it currently allows taxpayer money to fund military operations 
which use child soldiers if those operations are in the “national interest.” 
Congress must update the law to include a definition of “national interest.”  
Does “national interest” include counter-terrorism operations? 
Preventing narcotics trafficking? Would the situation where an American 
soldier’s likelihood of surviving a battle is increased because there are 
more fighters present be in the national interest even if those fighters are 
underage? Similarly, should the role children play in armed groups– if they 
are engaged in hostilities, subjected to sexual exploitation, or just used for 
chores and errands at an army base be a factor when contemplating 
waivers? 
In many cases it is easier to waive CSPA’s application than find a 
solution that does not involve child soldiers. A binding a well-defined rule 
for when armies who use child soldiers cannot be funded would put 
pressure on the U.S. to pursue a strategy which does not involve child 
soldiers and would pressure foreign governments in the way CSPA was 
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designed to do. 
If Congress does not believe anti-narcotics funding is a sufficient 
excuse to allow U.S. foreign aid to go to child soldiers, the CSPA must be 
updated to encompass both taxpayer funds appropriated as military aid and 
as international drug control spending. It is concerning that training and 
equipment provided to foreign police departments is not currently 
encompassed by the CSPA. This allows police forces in countries who use 
child soldiers, whose military aid restrictions have not been waived, to 
nevertheless receive American taxpayer funded equipment and training. 
C. DEFINE WHAT REMEDY SHOULD BE PURSUED IF CSPA IS 
VIOLATED 
Secretary of State Tillerson decided to de-list Myanmar and Iraq from 
the TiP list despite hearing from his own diplomats and State Department 
officials that the countries used child soldiers and knowing that he could 
easily issue a waiver if his policy goal was to provide military aid to those 
countries.  
The TiP report is a valuable public record and CSPA requires it to 
include information on which countries use child soldiers. Deliberate 
omission of information from the report, causing it to go against a U.N. 
report on the same issue, lowers the credibility and reliability of the State 
Department in the international community. While State Department 
officials circulated a memo regarding how Secretary Tillerson’s decision 
was “contravening U.S. law,” they had no real way to challenge it.178 
Currently, responsibilities of the U.S. House of Representatives 
Foreign Affairs Committee include “oversight and legislation relating to 
foreign assistance” and “activities and policies of the State, Commerce, and 
Defense Department and other agencies related to the Arms Control Act 
and the Foreign assistance Act, including export and licensing policy.”179 
The Committee may open inquiries into how legislation has been enacted 
and formally censure officials as a result.180 “Censure and other disapproval 
methods generally have no legal effect” but it is in the interest of agencies 
to be well-regarded by the committees which oversee them because 
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Congress has significant influence over their budgets.181  
The CSPA should be updated to provide further oversight to ensure 
officials comply with its reporting obligations. This could be done by 
mandating an inquiry any time there are discrepancies between child-
soldiering States listed by TiP and child-soldiering States listed by the 
U.N.. 
D. INVEST IN FOREIGN AID AIMED IN REDUCING CONDITIONS THAT 
PRODUCE CHILD SOLDIERS 
The purpose of CSPA is in preventing taxpayer money from funding 
child soldiers, rather than providing foreign aid. Nevertheless, Congress 
should find a way to advance to goals of the Optional Protocol that is not 
just premised on States’ desires to accrue weapons because a State’s 
increased military capabilities may not stabilize regions where armed 
conflict is rampant. Foreign aid should be proactively invested in 
education, job training, and rehabilitation programs in these regions. This 
would empower youth in those countries and contribute to breaking cycles 
of violence caused by the weapons transfers.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by reports of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw, 
UWSA, and KNLA, the recruitment of children into armed groups is a sad 
and complicated problem that presents no easy solution. The U.N.’s 
Optional Protocol set 18 as the minimum recruitment age but provided little 
incentives for State parties to comply with their duties under the treaty. The 
CSPA provided an incentive for State parties to fulfill their obligations and 
remove the complicity of American funds in supporting armies which 
conscript child soldiers. However, it has not been effective at curbing the 
practice because it does not address underlying instability and is too easily 
circumvented– as evidenced by the $4 billion in military assistance granted 
to offending countries who received waivers and the $1 million in counter-
narcotics support given to the MPF. In order to improve outcomes, the 
CSPA should be amended to limit waivers, prohibit anti-narcotics 
equipment and training from going to police forces in countries whose 
armies use child soldiers, and do a better job supporting initiatives which 
would address the underlying causes for why children take up arms. 
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